If we define pain instead as some kind of typical behavior, like the disposition to writhe around, then that could apply to any number of creatures. 219, mind-brain identity theory seems too chauvinistic: If we say that what constitutes a pain is a particular type of brain state, then any type of creature that doesn't have a brain like ours by definition can't be in pain. Why be a functionalist? Well, as discussed in our ep. Check out this wiki page for a simple example of this. Hilary Putnam (whose article we're concentrating on in this first half) developed this idea, as presented seminally by Alan Turing, into "machine-table functionalism," where we get an idea of what a particular mental state is by creating a sort of a flowchart: If the machine is in a particular state (defined by the current values of numerous components) and receives a particular input, then it will (probably) move to a particular other state. Groups of neurons fire off in lawlike ways, transmitting information around the brain, and it's that information pattern that is the mind.
A functionalist theory of mental states, then, defines mental states not as essentially brain states, but as the organism performing some special class of tasks: being in pain, experiencing a memory, having a sensation of color, etc.Ī common analogy for this is that the brain is like the hardware that the mind runs on, and the mind is like the software code. It could be made of wood, or metal, or something else, but the point is that it has a structure that will achieve this task. What does this mean? Well, what makes something a mousetrap, for instance, is that it catches mice. What is the mind? Mark, Wes, Dylan, and Seth consider a theory of mind that defines things not by what they're made of, but what they do. Armstrong’s " The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981).
On Hilary Putnam’s " The Nature of Mental States" (1973) and David M.
Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 53:38 - 49.2MB)